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The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court
David A. Strauss∗
A generation after its end, the Warren Court has, in many ways, prevailed.
Decisions that were intensely controversial at the time—on racial segregation, school
prayer, reapportionment, and criminal justice—are now generally, even universally,
accepted. Not a single justice on the Court today accepts the view that was the leading
intellectual adversary of the Warren Court’s approach—the across-the-board judicial
restraint, espoused by Justice Felix Frankfurter, that asserted that the courts should
invalidate legislation only in extreme cases. The political culture seems to have become
comfortable with the idea that judges have a special responsibility to protect racial
minorities and similar groups, including political dissidents; that conception of the
judge’s role was central to the Warren Court. And even many of the Warren Court’s most
bitter critics, when pressed, have difficulty naming a single major Warren Court decision
that they would overrule if they could.
Despite all of that, the reputation of the Warren Court is still in some ways clouded.
In particular the idea persists that what the Warren Court was doing was not really law: it
was an “activist” Court that was not especially concerned with, or good at, the craft of
lawyering. That view is held explicitly and emphatically by detractors of the Warren
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Court, who see the Warren Court as having been so consumed with its political and social
agenda that it acted lawlessly, or nearly so.
But even people who agree with the outcomes of the major Warren Court decisions
sometimes distance themselves from the Warren Court itself. The criticism typically
takes the form of condemning “judicial activism of the left or the right,” with the Warren
Court (or “Warrenism”) seen as an example of the former, and the current Supreme
Court, the latter. And even some unabashed admirers of the Warren Court more or less
agree—sometimes apologetically, sometimes defiantly—that the law took a back seat to
the need to end racial segregation and oppressive police practices, government
suppression of speech, malapportioned legislatures, compelled prayer in schools, and the
other problems that the Warren Court addressed. When a Court is engaged in projects of
such great moral importance, it has to be allowed to act in a way that is, as a matter of
technical legal analysis and argument, a little questionable—so many of the Warren
Court’s admirers say. The ultimate justification for the Warren Court’s most celebrated
decisions, according to this line of thinking, is that those decisions were morally and
politically right. If they were legally unsound, that just means that we may have to
reexamine our notions of legal soundness.
It may be true that the ultimate justification of the Warren Court’s decisions is that
over time they have come to be seen as right as a matter of justice and good policy.
Perhaps there is a sense in which the legal soundness of a decision is, in the long run,
beside the point. But whether or not that view is correct, it is wrong to say that the
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Warren Court’s project was legally unsound. The Warren Court did things, in the name of
the Constitution, that the text of the Constitution does not compel and that conflict with
the understandings of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution. But it does not
follow that the Warren Court was deficient as a matter of legal craft.
In its major constitutional initiatives, the Warren Court was, in a deep sense, a
common law court. That might seem incongruous, because the one thing most people
agree on is that the Warren Court was innovative, and the common law approach, rooted
in precedent, is usually thought of as conservative and tradition-bound. But while the
Warren Court did break new ground in important ways, its major decisions were not as
severely cut off from tradition and precedent as one might think. And the common law,
for its part, is not as hidebound as one might think. Many of the great common law
judges—from Coke and Mansfield to twentieth-century American judges like Cardozo
and Roger Traynor—are famous for their innovations. The Warren Court belongs to that
common law tradition.
People also often think of the method of the common law as antithetical to the
interpretation of authoritative texts like the Constitution or a statute. The interpretation of
a text requires that one read the words of the text with great care and base the decision on
those words, or on other (“structural”) clues found in the words of the text. If the words
do not dictate a result, then, it is often thought, the next resort must be to the intentions of
those who drafted the document. By contrast, the common law approach treats no
specific text as authoritative. Instead it follows precedents that are subject to varying
interpretations and that can evolve over time.
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That sharp contrast between the common law and constitutional interpretation is, I
believe, mistaken. But for present purposes the point is that a common law approach is
not at all the same thing as what the Warren Court’s critics often accused it of doing—
more or less ignoring the limitations imposed by conventional legal materials in order to
do what seemed right. The common law approach, if taken seriously, imposes real
limitations on what judges can do—as has been demonstrated by centuries of legal
development in the familiar common law areas that we now know as contracts, torts, and
property. In fact the limits are more substantial than the limits imposed by the text and
the original intentions. The justices of the Warren Court were not just enlightened (or
not) judicial activists who had a good sense (or not) of how the winds of history were
blowing. They were enlightened, in my view, and they were in a sense activists, and they
were in many ways on the right side of history. But they were also—in their
constitutional decisions—squarely in the tradition of English and American common law
judges.
I will try to defend this claim by considering, principally, the Warren Court
initiatives that aroused the greatest contemporary controversy and the most vehement
charges of lawlessness—the famous school desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of
Education;1 and the reform of criminal procedure, as typified by the two most celebrated
criminal procedure decisions, Miranda v. Arizona2 (which required the police to warn a
suspects who were in custody before questioning them) and Gideon v. Wainwright3
(which required that counsel be made available to all defendants in felony cases). I will
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then discuss, more briefly, the reapportionment decisions, which present the common law
approach in different light. Another area in which the Warren Court made important and
innovative contributions—the protection of freedom of speech under the First
Amendment—also illustrates the common law method in operation; I have discussed that
elsewhere.4
I. The Common Law Approach
A. The premises of the common law
If you had to say, in a couple of words, what the common law approach is, you
would say: following precedent. In the run of cases that description is good enough. In
the traditional common law fields, cases are decided by following precedents that have
decided materially indistinguishable issues. That is also, as it happens, how most
American constitutional cases are decided—they are decided on the basis of precedents,
not of an examination of the text or the original understandings. But that gets ahead of the
argument. The characteristic common law impulse is to look to see what has been
decided before, and to use that as, at least, the starting point for deciding the current case.
Of course, sometimes it will not be clear what it means to follow precedent; the
proper reading of precedent may be in dispute. And sometimes, in common law systems,
the courts depart from precedent. In such instances, “follow precedent” is obviously
insufficient guidance. That injunction has to be supplemented by premises that explain
why following precedent is generally a good idea. Those premises therefore help decide
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what precedent requires, when that issue is in dispute. Those premises also help identify
the occasions on which one should depart from precedent. These premises of the common
law approach were systematically articulated by the great ideologists of the common
law—Hale, Coke, and (in some of his writings) Burke—and they have been reiterated
since, in various forms.
The first of these premises is a humility about—or, more neutrally, lack of
confidence in—individual human reason. It is unwise to try to resolve a problem without
deferring, to some degree, to the collected wisdom reflected in what others have done
when faced with a similar problem in the past. In more modern terms, the common law
approach reflects an understanding that human rationality is bounded. The problems that
judges confront are too difficult for any one individual’s reason to solve, and the
heuristics that have evolved through earlier decisions provide at least an important
starting point. This is a claim about human rationality generally, not just about judges,
and the use of something like a common law approach is of course not limited to judges.
Many other decisionmakers, both private and governmental, instinctively or selfconsciously follow precedent in making decisions.
The second premise, related to the first, is a kind of rough empiricism. It is a
mistake to approach complex issues—like those involved in major constitutional cases—
just on the basis of abstract ideas about how the world should be. The problems are too
complex for that, and the theories are inevitably too simplistic. We are better off looking
to the past to see what has worked and what hasn’t. If a practice seems to have worked
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well for an extended period of time, that is a reason to continue it, even if that practice is
not easy to reconcile with abstract principles that we find appealing. By the same token,
the best reason for revising or even overturning a practice is not that the practice deviates
from an abstract ideal. It is that the practice has been shown, by experience, not to work
well.
Of course, the judgment that a practice has or has not “worked well” necessarily
refers to some kind of normative conception. But the idea is to keep the normative
conception as uncontroversial as possible. If a legal doctrine, for example, leads to
uncertainty and confusion about what the law is, that is a sign that it is not working well.
On the other hand, if a doctrine is generally accepted by people with a wide range of
views and commitments, that is sign that it is working well. None of this is necessarily
dispositive in all cases, but the common law approach favors arguments of this form,
rather than arguments based on theoretical conceptions alone.
The third premise of the common law approach has to do with innovation. The
common law approach, as its leading practitioners understood it, was by no means hostile
to innovation. It was also not hostile to innovation undertaken frankly for reasons of what
we would call justice, or fairness, or good policy (“right reason” in the language of an
earlier era). There is nothing illegitimate about interpreting precedents in a way that
candidly promotes good results; there is nothing even necessarily illegitimate about
overruling precedents for that reason. What is required is that such innovation be
undertaken with due regard for what has gone before: that is, with due regard for the
limitations of abstract reasoning and the value of experience.

7

This means that innovation—change self-consciously undertaken in order to bring
about a morally better state of affairs—can be most solidly justified if it is rooted in the
past. This Burkean theme echoes throughout the ideology of the common law. To be
more concrete: A change can best be justified if it is relatively modest, and if events in
the past show, in accordance with rough common law empiricism, that the earlier
approach just wasn’t working very well. In addition, although modest and incremental
changes are the easiest to justify, a common law approach, properly understood, allows
for more dramatic changes as well. The collective wisdom of the past just enjoys a
presumption. A sharp, non-incremental change can be justified if you are very confident
that what has gone before is badly wrong. But then, too, it is best if you can show that
your conclusion about the need for change is based not just on your abstract principles
but on evidence about how badly the old regime worked.
In other words, a common law approach cautions against change but does not
preclude changes designed to bring about a fairer or more just world. Moreover, it is not
just an undifferentiated, go-slow caution, but an account of what kinds of justifications
are needed. You can be more confident about making changes if you can use the past
against itself, as it were: if you can show that the empirical lesson of the old regime is
that the old regime did not work very well.
These premises differentiate the common law approach from its competitors in
important ways. On the one hand, the common law approach—unlike approaches that
emphasize the text and the original understanding—is open about its use of moral
judgments. Under the common law approach, there is no need to try to show that a
decision—Brown v. Board of Education, for example—can be justified entirely on the
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basis of distinctively legal materials without referring to the fact that segregation was
wrong. On the common law approach, one can candidly say that part of the reason for
reaching a certain result was one’s conviction that that result was morally right. This
avoids one of the annoying features of approaches that emphasize the text and the
Framers’ intentions—the persistent attribution to the Framers or to the text of the
Constitution (if only you read it correctly!) views about constitutional issues that are, by
one of those happy accidents of history, identical to those of the interpreter.
On the other hand, the common law approach is unlike other views—such as those
that see constitutional law as a matter of developing moral conceptions in accordance
with the abstract language of the text5—because the common law approach places
relatively well-defined limits on the extent to which moral judgments may play a role in
interpreting the Constitution. Precedent is not infinitely manipulable, at least as long as
you are trying in good faith to act according to the premises of the common law
approach. This ensures that constitutional judgments will not become indistinguishable
from moral judgments.
Finally, the common law approach is more systematic than approaches that treat
constitutional interpretation as a matter of considering various disparate factors.6 Those
approaches are candid about the need to allow normative arguments, and they recognize
the need to impose limits on the use of those arguments. But the common law approach
has a specific historical referent and an extensive theoretical tradition, and its premises
can guide decisionmaking in the way that a multi-factor approach cannot.
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For essentially the same reasons, the common law approach can claim to be more
systematic, and more disciplined, than theories that rest on extended notions of popular
sovereignty, theories that can take a neo-republican or neo-Hamiltonian form.7 In
addition, some of those theories share with originalism a difficulty in accommodating the
legitimacy of moral argument; if the People are the ultimate source of constitutional law,
then, as with originalism, there will always be a tendency to attribute one’s own views to
the People. Alternatively, if the will of the people, or the nation’s evolving traditions, are
identified with moral judgments, then the theory is faced with the problem of how to limit
the use of such judgments in constitutional interpretation.
B. Common law innovation
The Warren Court’s most important innovations followed the common law
approach. But first it may be worthwhile to see that approach in its native habitat, in one
of the most famous examples of common law innovation, Cardozo’s opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.8
The question in MacPherson was whether an automobile manufacturer that sold a
defective car could be held liable, for negligence, for resulting injuries to a consumer,
when there was no contract between the manufacturer and the consumer. The black-letter
common law rule—the so-called “privity of contract” requirement—was that, as a
general matter, manufacturers were not liable to any party with whom they had not
contracted. Usually of course this did not include the ultimate consumer.
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The privity of contract rule traced its origin to the English case of Winterbottom v.
Wright, decided in 1842. Privity of contract was explicitly adopted in New York state in
1852, in Thomas v. Winchester.9 At the same time, though, New York, and other
jurisdictions, recognized an exception for “inherently dangerous” objects (or, as it was
sometimes put, “imminently dangerous” acts of negligence). A plaintiff could recover for
injuries caused by an inherently dangerous object, even if there was no privity of
contract. Thomas v. Winchester itself involved such an object—a mislabeled bottle of
medicine that actually contained poison—and so, notwithstanding the privity rule, the
plaintiff prevailed.
For the next 60 years, New York courts decided cases under this regime, classifying
various defective products as either “inherently dangerous” or not. In 1870, the New
York Court of Appeals ruled that a flywheel in a machine was not such an object. The
court explained: “Poison is a dangerous subject. Gunpowder is the same. A torpedo is a
dangerous instrument, as is a spring gun, a loaded rifle, or the like.” But the flywheel,
like “an ordinary carriage wheel, a wagon axle, or the common chair in which we sit”
was not inherently dangerous, so the privity requirement applied.10 Three years later, in
Losee v. Clute,11 the plaintiff was injured by a defective steam boiler; the court decided
that this, too, was an ordinary object, not an inherently dangerous one.
Nine years after that, though, the Court of Appeals decided that scaffolding was in
the “inherently dangerous” category. In the next two decades, intermediate appellate
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courts in New York concluded that a defective building, an elevator, and a rope supplied
to lift heavy goods all fell within the exception for “inherently dangerous” objects. In
1908, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a bottle of “aerated water” was
inherently dangerous; and finally, in 1909, that a large coffee urn was inherently
dangerous. All of these New York cases purported to apply the accepted rule, that a
plaintiff had to show privity of contract unless a product was inherently dangerous. The
later cases did not question the authority of the earlier cases, but they consistently ruled
that the product was inherently dangerous, and so allowed the plaintiff to recover.
MacPherson involved an automobile with a defective wheel; there was no privity of
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. The parties presented the issue as
whether the product was inherently dangerous. Cardozo’s celebrated opinion in
MacPherson dispatched the privity requirement altogether. The court held essentially that
a negligent manufacturer would be liable to anyone who could foreseeably be hurt by its
negligence. Soon after MacPherson, the privity rule was repudiated in many other
jurisdictions.
Cardozo has been criticized for not being candid in his treatment of the earlier
cases, for not being explicit about the extent to which his opinion changed the law, and
for not acknowledging that he was influenced by his own view that the privity rule was
not good policy. But whatever the merits of those criticisms, MacPherson is an exemplar
of how innovation can be consistent with the premises of the common law approach.
While Cardozo was very circumspect, he left little doubt that he thought the privity
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requirement was a bad idea. But he did not rest (or need to rest) his conclusion on that
ground alone. The earlier cases had demonstrated that the privity regime was no longer
workable. At one time, perhaps, it was possible to distinguish between “inherently
dangerous” objects and objects that were (in the words of another foundational English
case) part of “the ordinary intercourse of life.” But by the time of MacPherson, that
distinction had broken down. Courts applying it had decided that a steam boiler was part
of the ordinary intercourse of life but a coffee urn and a bottle of aerated water were
“inherently dangerous.” MacPherson then presented the question of how to classify an
automobile. The question was unanswerable; the governing rule no longer made any
sense. Cardozo’s conclusion that the privity rule had to be discarded was supported not
just by his own views about good policy but by several decades’ experience under that
rule.
In particular, Cardozo was able to claim that the outcomes of the earlier decisions
were consistent with the principle that a manufacturer is liable for foreseeable injuries
caused by its negligence. That was true even though the reasoning of the earlier cases was
based on the privity regime and the “inherently dangerous” exception. It was particularly
true of the more recent cases—the scaffolding, coffee urn, and aerated water cases—
which made much more sense if they were understood as applications of the
foreseeability rule rather than the “inherently dangerous” exception.
The MacPherson opinion is famous,12 but its basic approach is not novel. Even the
next major development in product liability law, the movement from negligence to strict
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liability, was the result of opinions that, although different in emphasis and much more
explicit about the role of policy, were essentially similar to Cardozo’s. A crucial part of
the argument for strict liability was that the application of the negligence standard,
especially conjoined with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, was, in practice, increasingly
but haphazardly imposing what amounted to strict liability. “It is needlessly circuitous to
make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without
negligence.”13 In addition, explicit strict liability already existed in comparable situations,
such as when there was a contract and an implied warranty and when food products were
sold. That precedent-based, experiential evidence that the negligence standard was not
working—coupled with the superiority of strict liability as a matter of policy—was the
justification for the innovation.
In constitutional law, the famous evolution in the due process limits on personal
jurisdiction—from Pennoyer v. Neff to International Shoe v. Washington—is another
example of common law development on the model of MacPherson. Initially the courts
applied the principle that personal jurisdiction had to rest either on the defendant’s
presence in the forum or on the defendant’s consent. But the increased use of the
corporate form made the notion of presence more and more fictitious. The notion of
consent was stretched, and also became increasingly fictitious, to deal both with
corporations and with defendants who engaged in business in the forum, or (as in the case
of automobile drivers) committed an alleged tort in the forum, and then left. After
decades of these increasingly fictitious constructs, the Court in International Shoe
established a new principle that made personal jurisdiction depend on the nature of the
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defendant’s contacts with the forum state. But the Court in International Shoe was able to
say that the old rubrics had broken down, and that the cases decided under the old rubrics
in fact were more easily understood as resting on the nature of the defendant’s contacts.
Those old cases helped demonstrate the soundness of the new principle.
II. The Warren Court
A. Brown v. Board of Education
1. What justifies Brown?
It is a commonplace now to say that any approach to constitutional interpretation, if it
is to be taken seriously, must be consistent with Brown. If a theory about the Constitution
leads to the conclusion that Brown was illegitimate, then the theory must go. But Brown’s
iconic character operates mostly in a negative way: it means that certain forms of
originalism must be dispatched. That is because by common (although not quite
universal) agreement, Brown v. Board of Education is inconsistent with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed Brown was really known to be such
when it was decided: After hearing argument once in the case, the Court specifically
asked for briefing on the historical background of the Fourteenth Amendment and then,
in its opinion in Brown, essentially disavowed any reliance on original intentions—a
pretty clear sign that it did not find much there to support its conclusion.
Showing that Brown disproves originalism, however, does not tell us what approach
to constitutional interpretation Brown supports, or why Brown is correct. To the extent
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there is a generally accepted answer to that question, it is along these lines.14 The
Fourteenth Amendment enacted a commitment to equality. The understanding at the time
it was enacted was that equality did not preclude segregation, but what was enacted was
the principle of equality, not that specific understanding about segregation. At the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 decision that infamously upheld a state law mandating
segregation, the Court (and most of the country) thought that segregation was compatible
with equality. But by 1954, we knew better. We understood that separate but equal was
impossible. On this account, Brown is not really inconsistent with the original
understanding, once the original understanding is characterized the right way. The
disagreement with the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment concerns the
implementation of the principle, not the principle itself, and on that level we are not
bound by what the drafters thought. Or, in a variant of the argument, the drafters and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected that we would not be bound at that level,
so that when we disagree with their conclusions about segregation, we are not really
thwarting their intentions.
This kind of argument is open to a familiar objection. If the original understanding, or
the requirements of the text, are characterized at a sufficiently high level of abstraction,
then the question of what is constitutional becomes, in practice, indistinguishable from
the question of what justice or good policy requires. If the Fourteenth Amendment just
enacts a principle of equality—without enacting any more specific judgments about what
kinds of laws are consistent with equality—then the Fourteenth Amendment can be
interpreted to require equality of income or wealth, or it can be interpreted not even to
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require racial equality. It all depends on what, as a moral matter, equality requires. That
gives present day interpreters too much leeway. Few people think that the Constitution
imposes so few restraints.
To put the point another way, if, as seems likely, the generation that adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment made a judgment that segregation was consistent with the
Amendment, what basis do we have today (or did the Court have in 1954) to disagree
with that judgment? Some defenses of Brown seem to treat that judgment as if it were a
factual question. But while an understanding of the factual nature of segregation helps,
the judgment obviously has a crucial moral component. The claim that we knew
segregation to be inherently unequal in 1954, although we did not know that in 1896, is
not like a claim about a scientific or archeological discovery. It is a moral judgment, at
least in part. The problem then is to give an account of why Brown is not just an instance
of the Supreme Court’s enforcing its moral judgments. It is not clear that the prevailing
understanding of Brown can give that account.
2. Brown and the common law approach
Arguments based on the text and original understandings, then, provide a very
uncertain basis for Brown, and arguments based on moral conceptions seem to
acknowledge too little in the way of constitutional restraint. There is, however, a strong
common law case to be made for the result in Brown. It was a case made at the time, and
in the Court’s opinion, to a degree. The common law argument for Brown relies in part
on the moral wrongness of segregation. But it also relies on arguments drawn from
precedent. The cases leading up to Brown—in a development that resembled the line of

17

cases preceding MacPherson—had already left “separate but equal” in a shambles.
Brown certainly did something that no previous case had done, but Brown was the
completion of a common law process, not an isolated, pathbreaking act.
Plessy, decided in 1896, upheld a state law requiring railroads to provide “equal but
separate accommodations for the white and colored races.” Rigid racial segregation in
fact had shallower roots in the South than many once supposed; Jim Crow laws were not
instituted systematically after the abolition of slavery but rather became widespread in the
South only in the late nineteenth century. This was the argument of C. Vann Woodward’s
The Strange Career of Jim Crow, published in 1957, and the opinion in Brown—perhaps
adverting to this historical research—made a point of noting that “‘separate but equal’ did
not make its appearance in this court until 1896.” That itself is relevant, under the
common law approach.
In the two decades following Plessy, the Court applied the “separate but equal”
principle in two cases involving education without reconsidering its validity.15 The Court
also rebuffed, on narrow grounds, Commerce Clause challenges to laws requiring
segregation in transportation. But at the same time, the Court sowed some of the seeds of
the common-law demise of “separate but equal.”
In McCabe v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,16 the Court dealt with an
Oklahoma law requiring separate but equal railroad facilities. This law permitted a
railroad to have sleeping, dining, and chair cars for whites even if it did not have

15

Cumming v. Bd. of Ed., 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).

16

235 U.S. 151 (1914).

18

supposedly equal cars for blacks. The state defended the law on the ground that there was
essentially no demand from blacks for these facilities. The Court rejected that argument
and invalidated the statute. “It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of
the laws, and if he is denied . . . a facility or convenience in the course of his journey
which under substantially the same circumstances is furnished to another traveler, he may
properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded.” 17
Three years later, in Buchanan v. Warley, the Court invalidated a statute that forbade
whites from living in a block where a majority of the homes were occupied by blacks,
and vice versa. The suit (which was apparently a deliberately arranged test case) was
brought by a white seller seeking specific performance of a contract to sell to a black
person. The Court’s reasoning emphasized the seller’s right to dispose of his property as
he saw fit, rather than any right to be free from racial discrimination. But the state
defended the law as a permissible regulation of property, and the tension with Plessy is
apparent: if separate but equal is a reasonable form of regulation of one kind of economic
transaction (the purchase of a railroad ticket), why isn’t the checkerboard law, arguably a
version of separate but equal, a reasonable regulation of real property?
Twenty years later, after the NAACP’s legal campaign against Jim Crow laws had
begun, the seeds sown in McCabe and Buchanan bore fruit. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada,18 an African-American student was denied admission to the all-white University
of Missouri Law School. Missouri operated an all-black state university, Lincoln
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University, that did not have a law school. Instead, state law authorized state officials to
arrange for blacks to attend law school in neighboring states and to pay their tuition.
The Court ruled that this scheme did not satisfy “separate but equal.” The Court
refused to address arguments that out-of-state opportunities for the student were equal to
those in Missouri. “The basic consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities, other
States provide, or whether they are as good as those in Missouri, but as to what
opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students and denies to [blacks] solely
upon the ground of color.”19 Since a black resident, but not a white resident, would have
to leave the state for a legal education, the Court concluded, there was a denial of equal
protection of the laws.20 The Court also relied on McCabe to dismiss Missouri’s
argument that few African-Americans in Missouri sought a legal education (Gaines was,
apparently, the only one who ever had).21
There is a direct line from McCabe, decided in 1914, to Gaines, decided in 1938, and
a direct line from Gaines to Brown. Theoretically, after Gaines, a state might still be able
to satisfy the Constitution by establishing a separate law school for blacks. But given the
limited number of black applicants, that was impractical—a circumstance that McCabe
and Gaines said was irrelevant. So, as a practical matter, Gaines left many states with no
choice but to admit blacks to graduate school. Perhaps more important, by refusing to
consider the argument that out-of-state law schools were as good as Missouri’s, the Court
was, in effect, holding that the provision of tangibly equal educational opportunities was
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Id. at 350-51.
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not enough to satisfy “separate but equal.” The state had to treat blacks and whites
equally in some way that went beyond that. In this way, Gaines suggested that symbolism
mattered, not just tangible equality. That principle was ultimately incompatible with
separate but equal.
In the decade after Gaines, the Court did not decide any more “separate but equal”
cases, but it did invalidate racial discrimination in jury selection, hold the white primary
unconstitutional, and rule that segregation in interstate transportation facilities violated
the Commerce Clause. In 1948, Shelley v. Kraemer held that the Constitution forbade the
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants. Also in 1948, in Sipuel v. Oklahoma State
Regents,22 the Court held that Oklahoma violated the Equal Protection Clause when it
excluded an African-American from the University of Oklahoma law school because she
was black. The Court ruled that the case was controlled by Gaines.23
Then, two years later, the Court effectively took away whatever breathing room
Gaines had left for separate but equal. In Sweatt v. Painter, the Court held that a law
school Texas had established for African-Americans was not equal to the University of
Texas Law School; the Court identified the substantial tangible inequalities between the
two schools but went out of its way to say that “those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school” were “more
important.” Of course the newly-established school could not possibly match the
University of Texas in those respects.
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McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,24 decided the same day as Sweatt, turned
entirely on intangible factors. It held that “separate but equal” was not satisfied when an
African-American was admitted to a previously all-white graduate school but was made
to sit in a certain seat in the classroom, had to sit alone in the cafeteria, and had a special
table in the library. The Court explained that these conditions harmed McLaurin’s
“ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and,
in general, to learn his profession.”25 After Sweatt, a state could not satisfy separate but
equal by establishing a new all-black graduate school, because any such school, however
equal tangibly, could not possibly match the intangible assets that the white school had.
After McLaurin a state could not segregate African-Americans within the established
white school. What was left? “Given what came before, the real question is why Brown
needed to be decided at all.”26
Observers at the time were aware that this progression of cases had left “separate but
equal” hanging by a thread. The certiorari petition in Sweatt cited the earlier cases and
asserted that they fatally undermined Plessy. After Sweatt and McLaurin, the New
Republic said that segregation was “in handcuffs.” Some Southern law reviews also
concluded that those cases meant the end of segregation. The briefs in Brown, not
surprisingly, emphasized Sweatt and McLaurin. The opinion in Brown supported its
famous conclusion about the effect of segregation on the “hearts and minds” of grade
school students by quoting passages from Sweatt and McLaurin that emphasized the
importance of intangible factors; the Court in Brown said “[s]uch considerations apply
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with added force to children in grade and high schools.” Brown’s citation of
psychological research attracted much more attention, but precedent plays a larger role in
the opinion.
Of course, Brown was not received as merely the formal, more or less inevitable
culmination a common law evolution. The justices themselves apparently did not think of
Brown that way. Brown was vastly more controversial than any of the earlier decisions.
There are many possible reasons for this—Brown involved grade schools and high
schools, not postgraduate education, and the explicit rejection of separate but equal had
tremendous symbolic significance. But on the question of the justification of Brown—as
opposed to the symbolic or political effect it had on the South and the nation—Brown
rested solidly on precedent.
In particular, Brown is parallel to MacPherson. A governing doctrine—privity of
contract with the exception for inherently dangerous products, or separate but equal—had
been the established law for some time. For a while it was applied with a degree of
coherence. But then the coherence began to fray. The decisions holding that certain
arrangements were unequal (in McCabe, Buchanan, and Gaines) raised questions about
exactly what would constitute equality, just as the decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals about scaffolds and coffee urns, while making some sense under the old rubric,
raised questions about what products weren’t inherently dangerous. Like MacPherson,
Brown was not dictated by the earlier cases. But it could rely on the earlier cases to show,
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in effect, that the formal abandonment of the old doctrine was no revolution but just the
final step in a common law development.
B. Gideon
Gideon v. Wainwright was not remotely as controversial as Brown when it was
decided, but it was in many ways emblematic of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
revolution. Gideon, which was decided in 1963, held that state criminal defendants have
the right to appointed counsel in felony cases, even if they cannot afford to hire a lawyer.
Like other Warren Court criminal procedure cases, Gideon ruled that a specific provision
of the Bill of Rights, in this case the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that a criminal
defendant shall have “the assistance of counsel for his defense,” applied to the states. In
doing so, Gideon overruled a precedent—Betts v. Brady, which had held, 21 years earlier,
that whether counsel must be appointed in a state prosecution was to be decided case by
case, under the Due Process Clause, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, by
determining whether the failure to appoint counsel denied “fundamental fairness.”
Like other Warren Court criminal procedure decisions, Gideon could not be easily
justified on the basis of original understandings. There seems little doubt that the original
understanding of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel was that it gave an accused the
right to have his own, retained counsel, not the right to have counsel appointed at the
state’s expense. Even the Gideon opinion did not suggest otherwise. In any event, the
Sixth Amendment was intended to apply only to the federal government, and nothing in
the history of the Due Process Clause Fourteenth Amendment suggested that that Clause
was intended to create an across-the-board right to counsel in state criminal prosecutions.
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If Gideon was not supported by the original understandings, and required that a
precedent be overruled, the question of justification again arises: did Gideon rest on
anything other than the justices’ view that appointed counsel was a good idea? In fact
Gideon was supported by a pattern of cases that resembled that preceding Brown, and
MacPherson. The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Black, did discuss precedent, but
not in this way; instead it argued that Betts itself was an “abrupt departure” from previous
cases. But Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion criticized that claim, and Justice Harlan
seems to have had the better of the argument. None of the pre-Betts cases, fairly read,
really suggests an across-the-board rule requiring states to appoint counsel in all felony
cases.
The better basis for Gideon was that—as Justice Harlan put it—the case-by-case rule
of Betts “has continued to exist in form while its substance has been substantially and
steadily eroded.” The erosion occurred in several stages. Even before Betts, the Court had
suggested that there was an automatic right to appointed counsel in any capital case.27
The Court reiterated that suggestion in dictum in 1948, and finally issued a square
holding to that effect in 1961.28
Meanwhile, in non-capital cases, the Court, while applying Betts, progressively
narrowed the circumstances in which counsel did not have to be appointed. Between
1942, when Betts was decided, and 1950, the Court, on several occasions, sustained
convictions of defendants who were denied appointed counsel.
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But at the same time,
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the Court overturned convictions in several cases that presented issues that, while not
entirely routine, did not seem exceptionally complex.30 Then from 1950 on, the Court,
still applying Betts, reversed in every right to counsel case that came before it. In each
case, the Court identified some occasion, during the proceedings, when the defendant
might have benefited from counsel—an objection counsel might have made that the pro
se defendant did not;31 lines of investigation or argument that “an imaginative lawyer”
might have pursued;32 or complex tactics that might at least have mitigated the
sentence.33
In this way, Gideon follows the same common law pattern as Brown and
MacPherson. The Court in Gideon was able to say, had it chosen to do so, that its
decision was supported not just by its own ideas about the importance of counsel but by
two decades’ worth of experimentation with the rule of Betts. Betts had supposed that
there was a significant category of trials that were fair even though the defendant who
wanted a lawyer did not have one; the experience of subsequent cases showed that Betts
was wrong—just as the parallel progression of cases showed that Plessy was wrong in
assuming that separate could be equal. That progression, rather than the text of the
Constitution or the original understandings, was the basis for the Court’s decisions.
Gideon—like Miranda, the reapportionment cases, and even, in an important sense,
Brown—overturned a discretionary, case-by-case standard for a much more strict rule.
This movement to rules was another characteristic of Warren Court decisions, although
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there are important exceptions.34 It is sometimes thought that discretionary standards,
rather than rules, are characteristic of the common law. This seems to be at least an
overstatement; common law courts developed a number of rules, and some prominent
common law judges (notably Holmes) thought that common law courts should try to
reduce discretionary standards to rules as much as possible—thus anticipating, in a sense,
what the Warren Court did in constitutional law.
The central point, however, is not the nature of the new regime that the Warren Court
instituted, but its justification. In both Brown and Gideon, the Warren Court was on solid
ground in saying that its choice of a new, more rule-like approach, was justified not just
by its views of morality or good policy, but by the precedents. The precedents, in seeking
to apply the more flexible approach, had ended up, in fact although not in name,
following a rule.
C. Miranda
Miranda v. Arizona, much more controversial than Gideon—and, unlike Brown, still
under attack in some quarters—presents a more complex case of common law
development. In Brown and Gideon (and MacPherson) the Court was able to say that its
decision did little more than ratify a development that had already occurred. The old
regime had broken down; it could not coherently be followed any more. In reality it had
been replaced by a new regime, and it only made sense to recognize as much.
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The Court’s decision in Miranda was more creative. In Miranda, too, the old regime
had broken down. But it was not plausible to argue, in Miranda, that the new rules had
already emerged in the cases and just needed to be recognized. Still, the basic
justification for Miranda is a common law justification. The reason for the Miranda rules
was not that they were required by the text of the Constitution or the original
understandings, obviously, but it was also not just that the Court thought they were a
good idea. Rather, the justification was that experience with the old approach showed that
that approach did not work very well. Something had to replace it. That conclusion—
although not the actual Miranda rules themselves—was firmly supported by the common
law-like development of precedent.
This aspect of the background of Miranda seems fairly well-known, better known
than the comparable aspects of Brown and Gideon. Miranda held that statements that
were the product of custodial interrogation of the accused could not be admitted in a
criminal prosecution unless the accused had been given certain specific, now-famous
warnings, and had waived the rights described in those warnings. (Subsequent cases held
that statements obtained in violation of Miranda could be used for certain purposes, but
those decisions are not the concern here.) Before Miranda, the admissibility of statements
made in response to interrogation was determined by a “voluntariness” test derived from
the Due Process Clause. That test asked whether the suspect’s “will” had been
“overborne” by the interrogation.
The dissenting opinions in Miranda described the voluntariness test as “workable and
effective,” but there was, by the time of Miranda, abundant evidence that it was not
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(including earlier criticism by some of the Miranda dissenters).35 The voluntariness
approach suffered from the usual problems of case-by-case approaches that examine all
the circumstances: it led to unpredictable and inconsistent decisions, and therefore
offered insufficient guidance to the police. But the voluntariness test had other problems
as well.36 Unlike some other notorious case-by-case approaches—that involved in the
obscenity cases before Miller v. California, for example—the voluntariness test depended
on finding highly disputed facts. The application of the test was, therefore, hostage to a
“swearing contest” between the police and the suspect. Moreover, even if the facts were
not in dispute, the voluntariness test, in any close case, depended on an understanding of
the atmospherics and the nuances, which could determine whether police tactics went too
far.
Even if all of that could be reconstructed adequately, the basic inquiry of the
voluntariness test was not coherently defined. The Court was never able to give any
standard for judging when an interrogation tactic crossed the line from proper (indeed
commendable) police work into illegal coercion. By contrast, the approach advocated
long ago by Wigmore—that the admissibility of a statement should turn on whether it
was obtained by means that were likely to induce a false confession—can certainly be
faulted on various grounds, but it would at least have provided some coherent metric. But
the Court did not go in that direction; in fact, in a 1961 decision, it said that in assessing
the voluntariness of a confession the courts should not even consider whether the tactics
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were likely to produce a false confession.37 The result was that the Supreme Court was
repeatedly fragmented and the lower court decisions showed no coherence.
For all these reasons, by the time of Miranda, the Court was on solid common-law
ground in saying that the voluntariness test should be discarded. Several decades’
experience provided more than adequate evidence that it did not work. The destructive
part of Miranda, so to speak, therefore rested on a secure common law justification. But
the constructive part—the requirement of specific warnings and a waiver—cannot be
justified on common law grounds, and the Court did not attempt to do so. Conspicuously,
the Miranda opinion justified the rules themselves as a quasi-legislative solution to the
problems posed by what the Court thought were prevalent police practices.
It would certainly be possible to argue that some third approach—different from
either Miranda or the voluntariness test—is better than either. Of course the Court
acknowledged this possibility, when it invited a legislative solution and said that an
adequate legislative solution could displace the rules it had adopted. It would even be
possible to argue, on the merits, that for all the weaknesses of the voluntariness test, the
need to obtain confessions was so great—and the Miranda rules were such a hindrance to
that effort—that the voluntariness approach is still better than Miranda.
The characteristic attack on Miranda, however, was different from that kind of
relatively fine-grained criticism of the merits of the decision. The characteristic attack
was that Miranda was an act of judicial usurpation, a case in which the Warren Court
went beyond the bounds of proper judicial conduct. The Miranda rules themselves
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require (and I think can be provided) a different kind of defense, but the decision to
abandon the voluntariness test was thoroughly justified under the common law approach.
D. Reapportionment
Of all the Warren Court’s important decisions, the reapportionment cases are the most
difficult to fit with a common law model. There was certainly no development of judicial
precedent paralleling the disintegration of the privity of contract rule or “separate but
equal.” Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, perhaps more than any other major Warren
Court decisions, were a sharp break with past decisions. The most immediate precedent—
Colegrove v. Green—famously ruled that the Court would not enter the “political
thicket” by considering claims that state legislatures were malapportioned. And, like
many other Warren Court decisions, the reapportionment decisions found scant support in
original understandings. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment—the basis for the
decisions—apparently was not intended to apply to voting at all, and there is no evidence
that the Framers of either the original Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment meant
to outlaw malapportioned legislatures.
Nonetheless, the reapportionment decisions, highly controversial at the time, quickly
became uncontroversial. Today the basic principle of “one person, one vote,” whatever
its difficulties in application, seems beyond challenge as a general matter. This relatively
rapid acceptance of the core principle of the reapportionment decisions should suggest
that those decisions were rooted in something deeper than—as the dissenters charged at
the time—just the Court’s idea of the best conception of democracy.
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The best common law-like justification for the reapportionment decisions is that they
carried out a development that extended back to the earliest days of the Republic—the
inexorable (although not uninterrupted) expansion of the franchise. Property
qualifications for voting were universal among the colonies; by the time of the
Revolution, some had been eliminated. Then, in several waves of reform in the early
nineteenth century, property qualifications were widely abolished, and by 1840
“universal” suffrage (limited to white males) became the norm. African Americans were
nominally enfranchised by the Fifteenth Amendment, and in fact did vote in many places,
South and North, until the last decades of the nineteenth century. The movement for
women’s suffrage gained speed at the beginning of the twentieth century and culminated
of course in the Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in 1920. Beginning in the late 1950s,
even before the Voting Rights Act, the vote was increasingly restored to blacks in the
border South.
This was not an uninterrupted march of progress, of course. Blacks were massively
disenfranchised at the turn of the last century, and the Progressive Era was characterized
by a variety of devices that were designed to limit the exercise of the vote and succeeded
in doing so. Restrictions on voting by certain categories of individuals, notably people
convicted of crimes, remain important and controversial today. Nonetheless, by the time
of the reapportionment decisions, the nation had, in the words of one historian,
“achieve[d] … an essentially unrestricted national franchise.”38
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This history served as the background for the reapportionment decisions.
Malapportionment did not literally disenfranchise anyone, but the effect of
malapportionment was to make some votes count for more than others. That seems
inconsistent with the premises of universal suffrage, as the Court’s opinions noted. The
reapportionment decisions were no doubt based in part on the Court’s views about the
nature of democracy—both the view that arbitrary population inequalities were wrong,
and the well-known argument that the political process was in many places incapable of
correcting malapportionment, so the courts had to intervene. But those normative
arguments, however strong they are, did not stand alone. They were backed by
precedent—not judicial precedent, this time, but the repeated judgments of several
generations that restrictions on the franchise should be discarded in favor of political
equality.
This background was an integral part of the justification of the reapportionment
decisions. The decisions would have been on weaker ground—and the claims that the
Court was illegitimately overreaching would have been significantly stronger—if the
decisions did not seem to be in keeping with the long trend toward establishing equality
as the norm in political participation. That trend—the series of expansions of the
franchise—was the equivalent of a series of precedents. It was precedent based not on
judicial decisions but on larger movements in society. That kind of precedent is of course
harder to work with, and claims about a society’s “traditions” are notoriously subject to
manipulation. But in this case the characterization of the “precedents” as generally
endorsing political equality seems relatively straightforward. Although there were
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deviations, the dominant pattern was a series of decisions, by different generations, to
expand and equalize the franchise.
On common law premises, decisions of this kind—made by legislatures,
constitutional conventions, or other political processes—should also be allowed to justify
an innovation like the reapportionment cases. These past decisions, like judicial
precedents, help overcome the bounded rationality problems that the common law
approach identifies, and they provide a broad base of experience. They can, at least
potentially, limit the kinds of innovations that may be undertaken.
When James Madison changed his mind and decided that the Bank of the United
States was constitutional—one of the most striking instances of evolutionary
constitutional interpretation in our history, given Madison’s prominence as a Framer—he
did so because of the “repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of
[the Bank] in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government,
accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of
the nation.” The same kinds of considerations should be available to courts, and in the
case of the reapportionment decisions, they provide substantial support for what the
Warren Court did. As before, this is certainly not to say that the Court’s decision could be
justified on this ground alone. The history of the expansion of the franchise did not
dictate the reapportionment decisions. Other arguments, particularly the argument about
the blockage in the political process, were needed. But the broader precedent-based
argument—relying not just on what courts did but on what other institutions decided—is
in essence a common law approach, and it is an important part of the justification for
what the Court did in the reapportionment cases.
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III. Conclusion
Many questions about the Warren Court remain very much subject to debate. Did its
initiatives really accomplish very much, or were they at most symbolic? Was its moral
and political vision a good one? Did it have the right conception of the role of a court in a
democracy? Was it just the product of the elite culture of a particular era, so that it is
pointless to hold it up as a model? But the notion that the Warren Court was lawless
should be put to rest.
That notion may have gained currency for a number of different reasons, among them
the implicit premise that lawfulness must consist of fidelity to an authoritative text or to
the revered Framers. The fundamental legal soundness of the Warren Court’s major
decisions becomes clear, though, once one recognizes that there is another conception of
what it means to follow the law. The common law account emphasizes humility and
caution, and building on the past, but without denying the value of innovation and the
necessity of making moral judgments. The common law approach can combine these
elements without becoming unsystematic. Judged by that conception of lawfulness—
which has as strong a claim as any to be the right approach to American constitutional
law—the reputation of the Warren Court, on this count at least, should be secure.
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